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New Development
Debt Relief in 1999: Only One Step on a
Long Journey
Eric A. Friedmant
[P]eople need human rights and democracy, and poor people
need them most of all. They need them to protect themselves
against exploitation, and to insist on a model of development
which is not based on crude numbers, but takes account of life as
it is actually lived by ordinary people.
-U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan1
According to a top official in the Clinton Administration, the 1999
Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative, set forth by the
world's Group of Seven (G7) leading industrialized nations 2 in Cologne,
Germany in June 1999, would have "an enormous impact on poorer
countries, perhaps more than any other single action taken by the
developed countries at any time." 3 A United Nations Special Rapporteur
on the effects of foreign debt on the full enjoyment of economic, social,
and cultural rights and an independent expert on structural adjustment
had a markedly different opinion of the same initiative: "As it stands
t J.D. expected 2002, Yale Law School; B.A_ 1999, Yale College.
1. Kofi Annan, Address to the Annual Convention of the American Association of
Magazine Publishers and Editors (Oct. 19, 1998), in Press Release: Secretary-General
Calls United Nations Tailor-made Forum for Collective Effort to Address Global Financial
Crisis, U.N. Doc. SG/SM/6759 (1998), available at <http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/quotable/
6759.htm>.
2. The G7 nations are Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the
United States.
3. Roger Cohen, An Agreement on Debt Relief for Poor Lands, N.Y. TIMES, June 19,
1999, at Al (quoting President Bill Clinton's national security advisor, Sandy Berger).
1
Friedman: Debt Relief in 1999: Only One Step on a Long Journey
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2000
192 YALE HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT L.J. [Vol. 3:191
now, [this] initiative is grossly inadequate.. . ."-4 Despite their sharply
contrasting views, these commentators would doubtless all agree on the
gravity of the subject of the initiative: the large debts that many
impoverished developing countries owe to wealthy countries and
international financial institutions (IFIs).
Indeed, while the world's poorest countries spend tens to hundreds
of millions of dollars-and in several cases, over one billion dollars-
annually servicing their debts, large segments of their populations
remain without access to minimal health care, education, nutrition,
clean water, adequate shelter, and other human needs. Under the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR),5 States Parties are legally obligated to guarantee access to
minimum essential levels of these basic human rights,6 and to use all
available resources to progressively achieve full enjoyment of such
rights for all. 7 By continuing to insist that poor States use their scarce
resources for debt service payments, rather than for improved access to
health care, education, food, and basic shelter for their impoverished
populations, the international community becomes complicit in the
wide-scale violation of human rights.
In Part I of this New Development, I describe the magnitude of the
debt problem and explain its connection to a multitude of human rights
violations. Part II provides a brief overview of initiatives that the more
developed nations have undertaken in response to the debt. I then turn
in Part III to some of the practical effects and human rights
consequences of a 1996 debt relief plan, the Heavily Indebted Poor
Countries (HIPC) Initiative, upon which the 1999 initiative introduced
above was based. These observations will attest to the ability of debt
relief to serve as a tool central to improving human rights when the
relief is part of a larger strategy to reduce poverty.
Part IV explores the 1999 Enhanced HIPC Initiative. I discuss how
it works, how it links debt relief to poverty reduction, and how much of
a difference it is likely to have. I conclude that it is only one step
4. Reinaldo Figueredo & Fantu Cheru, Debt Relief and Social Investment: Linking The
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative to the HIV/AIDS Epidemic in Africa,
Post-Hurricane Mitch Reconstruction in Honduras and Nicaragua, and the Worst Forms
of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (Convention No. 182) of the International Labour
Organization, U.N. ESCOR, 56th Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 10, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/2000/51, para. 4 (2000), available at <http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.
nsflTestFrame/42e49accdf28dd7c802568950055f30b?Opendocument> [hereinafter Joint
Report on Debt Relief and Social Investment]. The Special Rapporteur was Reinaldo
Figueredo, and Fantu Cheru was the independent expert.
5. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966,
993 U.N.T.S. 3, 6 1.L.M. 360 (1966) [hereinafter ICESCR].
6. See The Nature of States Parties Obligations (art. 2, para.1), U.N. ESCOR, Comm.
on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rts, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 3, at 83, para. 10, U.N. Doc.
E/1991/23 (1990), available at <http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/MasterFrameView/
94bdbaf59b43a424c12563ed0052b664?Opendocument> [hereinafter General Comment
No. 3].
7. See ICESCR, supra note 5, art. 2.
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forward along a long road; it is not the leap ahead that the program's
promoters claim it to be. The amount of debt it meaningfully relieves
will prove relatively small, better than nothing but far from a panacea
for the human rights violations that are facilitated by heavy debt
obligations. Accordingly, in Part V I suggest steps that the more
developed and the developing nations could take to help enable debt
relief to live up to its potential to strengthen human rights.
I. THE CONNECTION BETWEEN DEBT, DEBT RELIEF, AND HUMAN RIGHTS
In 1996, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF)
formulated a debt relief plan, in which it deemed a set of nations the
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs). Mostly located in Africa,
these forty countries face a particularly crushing debt burden.8 They
owe foreign creditors, mostly wealthy nations and international
financial institutions, a total of about $207 billion,9 up from $55 billion
8. As of April 2000, the HIPC countries were: Angola, Benin, Bolivia, Burkina Faso,
Burma (Myanmar), Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Republic of
Congo, C6te d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea,
Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, Kenya, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Liberia,
Madagascar, Mali, Malawi, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger, Rwanda, Sio
Tom6 and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda,
Vietnam, Yemen, and Zambia. See World Bank, HIPC Countries (visited May 5, 2000)
<http://www.worldbank.org/hipc/aboutlmap/map.html>.
Initially there were 41 HIPC countries; both the number and composition of
countries involved in the HIPC debt relief program has fluctuated slightly. They are
indeed all very impoverished and heavily indebted nations, but they are not the only ones.
Jubilee 2000, the debt relief movement that had called on wealthy creditors to fully
forgive the debt of many highly indebted impoverished countries by the new millennium
and continues to call for that full debt relief, identifies 52 such countries, whose debts
total $354 billion. See Jubilee 2000 Coalition, Ten Questions About Jubilee 2000 (visited
Apr. 4, 2000) <http://www.jubilee2000uk.org/faq.html> [hereinafter Jubilee 2000
Coalition, Ten Questions]. All told, by 1997, developing nations had an external debt of
nearly $2 trillion. See Shridath Ramphal, Debt Has a Child's Face, in UNICEF, THE
PROGRESS OF NATIONS 1999, at 26, 32 (1999), available at <http://www.unicef.org/pon99/
pon99_5.pdf>. The debts began to grow rapidly in the late 1970s, when rising interest
rates and oil prices, and falling commodity prices, impeded the ability of many countries
to repay debts incurred during heavy borrowing earlier in the 1970s. Rarely did the
borrowed money actually go to improving the lives of ordinary people, and the
governments that borrowed the money were. by and large, corrupt and undemocratic. See
id. at 28.
9. See Kevin Morrison, Overseas Dev. Council, ODC Issue Brief Understanding Debt
Relief (visited Apr. 4, 2000) <http://www.odc.org/commentary/ibaug99.html>. These
countries owed foreign creditors $221 billion in 1998, of which $61 billion was owed to
multilateral creditors. See Joint Report on Debt Relief and Social Investment, supra note
4. Jubilee 2000 reports that of the $354 billion that the 52 countries the Coalition believes
are in urgent need of debt relief, about half is owed to multilateral creditors, 40 percent to
bilateral creditors, and 10 percent to private creditors. See Jubilee 2000 Coalition, Ten
Questions, supra note 8. The World Bank estimates that the cost of the 1999 debt relief
initiative could be more than $28 billion, to be approximately evenly divided between
bilateral and multilateral creditors. See World Bank, The HIPC Debt Initiative (visited
Apr. 4, 2000) <bttp://www.worldbank.orglhipc/about/hipcbr/hipcbr.htm> [hereinafter
World Bank, HIPC Initiative].
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in 1980 and $183 million in 1990.10 Although much of this debt burden
goes unpaid, the annual debt service paid by these nations is
nonetheless crippling. The magnitude of the human impact of the debt
payments is best captured in a single estimate made by the United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in its Human Development
Report 1997: "Relieved of their annual debt repayments, the severely
indebted countries could use the funds for investments [in human
development objectives] that in Africa alone would save the lives of
about 21 million children by 2000. . . ."I' The year 2000 is here. Most of
those children are not.
6 As this number implies, many of the world's poorest countries are
spending large portions of their budgets-money that could have been
spent on social services to benefit their people-on debt service
payments to wealthy nations and international financial institutions.
The forty HIPC countries were spending a total of about $8.6 billion per
year servicing their debts as the 1990s drew to a close. 12 In 1997/98, for
example, Tanzania spent $189.2 million on debt service payments, more
than it spent on either education ($163.4 million) or health care ($65.8
million).1 3 In 1998, Zambia spent over sixty-nine percent more on debt
service than it spent on health and education combined.1 4 Mauritania
also spent more on debt service in 1998 ($87.8 million) than on health
and education combined ($67 million), and almost five times more than
on health care alone ($17.4 million). 15 Mozambique's government
spending reads only slightly differently, as that country spent four
times more on debt service than on health care, and twice as much on
debt service as on education. 16 These cases are more the rule than the
10. See UNDP, Overview of Human Development Report 1997 (visited Apr. 4, 2000)
<http://www.undp.org/hdro/e97over.htm>. An estimate reported elsewhere is that if debt
service payments were re-directed to human needs in seven poor countries, the lives of 3
million children could be saved over the course of seven years. See Tanzania: Will Debt
Relief Bring About Expected Relief?, AFR. NEWS, Feb. 14, 2000, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Africa News File.
11. UNDP, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1997, at 93 (1997).
12. See Adam Jones & Lea Paterson, Why Do the Poor Still Pay the Rich?, TIMES
(London), Apr. 14, 2000, sec. II, at 36. For more statistics on total annual debt service
payments by the HIPC countries, see World Bank, Debt Service Paid (visited Apr. 24,
2000) <http://www.worldbank.org/hipc/about/debt-table/i2_.1pdf:>.
13. See IMF & INT'L DEV. ASS'N, TANZANIA: PRELIMINARY DOCUMENT ON THE
INITIATIVE FOR THE HEAVILY INDEBTED POOR COUNTRIES (HIPC INITIATIVE) 10 tbl. 6
(1999), available at <http://www.worldbank.org/hipc/country-cases/tanzania/
Tanzania_FIN.pdf> [hereinafter IMF & INT'L DEV. ASS'N, TANZANIA].
14. See Singy Hanyona, Zambia: Zambia's Debt Situation, AFR. NEWS, Jan. 6, 2000,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Africa News File.
15. See IMF & INT'L DEV. ASS'N, MAURITANIA: DECISION POINT DOCUMENT UNDER THE
ENHANCED HEAVILY INDEBTED POOR COUNTRIES (HIPC) INITIATIVE 16 box 4 (2000),
available at <http://www.worldbank.org/hipc/Mauritania.pdf>.
16. Mozambique spent $159 million on debt service payments in 1998. See WORLD
BANK, MOZAMBIQUE AT A GLANCE 2 (1999), available at <http://www.worldbank.org/data
countrydata/aag/mozaag.pdf>. In the same year, Mozambique spent about $40 million on
health care. See IMF & INT'L DEV. ASS'N, REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE: INITIATIVE FOR
HEAVILY INDEBTED POOR COUNTRIES (HIPC) COMPLETION POINT DOCUMENT para. 15
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exception.17
Both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
recognized as part of the International Bill of Rights, guarantee the
rights to adequate food, clothing, and shelter;'S the right to medical care
and to good health;19 the right to education, including free and
compulsory primary education;20 and the right to special care and
assistance for children. 21
By ratifying the Convention on the Rights of the Child, virtually
every country in the world has recognized "that every child has the
inherent right to life," and that States "shall ensure to the maximum
extent possible the survival and development of the child."2 2 The
Convention also requires States to "strive to ensure that no child is
deprived of his or her right of access to ... health care services" and
recognizes "the right of the child to the enjoyment of the highest
attainable standard of health."23 In order to realize this right, States
"shall take appropriate measures" to, inter alia, reduce infant and
childhood mortality and "[t]o combat disease and malnutrition"
through, among other measures, the "provision of adequate nutritious
foods and clean drinking-water." 24
(1999), available at <http://www.worldbank.org/hipc/country-cases/mozambique/
mozcompl.pdf>, and $80 million on education, see id. para. 12.
17. A 1998 UNDP and UNICEF survey covering 27 developing countries, many of
which were HIPC countries, found that the governments of only ten spent more on basic
social services (basic education, basic health care, safe water and sanitation provision,
family planning, and nutrition) than on debt service. Most figures were from 1996 and
1997. See UNDP, DEBT AND SUSTAINABLE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 14 (Technical Advisory
Paper No. 4, 1999), this section available at <http://magnet.undp.org/Docs/efa/techpaper4/
section2.pdf>; see also Ramphal, supra note 8, at 32.
18. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, art. 25(1), G.A. res.
217A (III), U.N. Doc A/810, at 71 [hereinafter Universal Declaration]; ICESCR, supra
note 5, art. 11(1), (2).
19. See Universal Declaration, supra note 18, art. 25(1); ICESCR, supra note 5, art.
12(1).
20. See Universal Declaration, supra note 18, art. 26(1); ICESCR, supra note 5, art.
13.
21. See Universal Declaration, supra note 18, art. 25(2); ICESCR, supra note 5, art.
10(3).
22. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, art. 6(1), (2), G.A. Res.
44/25, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., 61st mtg., Supp. No. 49, at 166, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/49
(1989), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 1448 (1989). Every country in the world except for Somalia
and the United States has ratified the Convention. See United Nations Treaty Collection,
Status of Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary General: Convention on the
Rights of the Child (visited Apr. 5, 2000) <http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/
enghshinternetbible/partIchapterIV/treaty15.asp> (password required). See also Steven
Lee Myers, Agreement Bars Using Children as Soldiers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2000, at A8.
23. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 22, art. 24(1).
24. See id. art. 24(2). The Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human
Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights guarantees the "right to
health, understood to mean the enjoyment of the highest level of physical, mental and
social well-being," the right to adequate nutrition, the right to free and compulsory
primary education, and special protection for children. Additional Protocol to the
American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural
5
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What obligations do States have with respect to these rights? The
most comprehensive account of States' obligations is found in the
Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, adopted in 1997 by a group of international law experts. 25 These
Guidelines underscore that State obligations to economic, social, and
cultural rights are the same as State obligations to civil and political
rights: "the obligations to respect, protect and fulfil[l]. '"26 Thus, States
may not negatively interfere with people's enjoyment of economic,
social, and cultural rights, States must prevent violations of such rights
by third parties, and States must take appropriate legislative, judicial,
Rights, Nov. 17, 1988. arts. 10, 12, 13(3)(a), 16, O.A.S.T.S. No. 69, reprinted in 28 I.L.M.
156 (1989) (entered into force Nov. 16, 1999), available at <http://www.oas.org/en/prog/
juridico/english/Treaties/a-52.html>. The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of
the Child guarantees children the right to life, the right to education "with a view to
achieving the full realization of this right [including] ... free and compulsory basic
education," and the "best attainable state of physical, mental and spiritual health," with
states taking measures, inter alia, to provide health care for all children and "adequate
nutrition and safe drinking water." African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the
Child, July 11, 1990, arts. 5, 11, 14, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990), reprinted in 1
AFR. Y.B. INT'L L. 295 (1993), available at <http://www.unhcr.ch/refworld/refworld/legal/
instrume/childrenafre.htm>. Article 2 of the first Protocol to the European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms provides: "No person
shall be denied the right to education." Protocol to the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Mar. 20. 1952. art. 2, 213
U.N.T.S. 262. available at <http://www.coe.fr/eng/legaltxt/9e.htm>. The European Social
Charter guarantees the right to protection of health and special social and economic
protection for mothers and children. See European Social Charter, Oct. 18, 1961, arts. 11,
17, 529 U.N.T.S. 89, available at <http://www.coe.fr/eng/legaltxt/35e.htm>. For more on
the right to food, see Philip Alston, International Law and the Human Right to Food, in
THE RIGHT TO FOOD 9, 19-49 (Philip Alston & Katarina Tomagevski eds., 1984)
(discussing the right to food as it exists in the ICESCR and other treaties).
25. The Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
in INT'L COMM'N OF JURISTS, ECONOMIC. SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: A COMPILATION
OF ESSENTIAL DOCUMENTS 79 para. 6 (1997), reprinted in 20 HuM. RTS. Q. 691 (1998),
available at <http://www.press.jhu.edu/journals/human-rights-quarterly/v020/20.
3intlcomm.html> [hereinafter Maastricht Guidelines]. These Guidelines were adopted
unanimously by a group of over 30 international experts at a January 1997 meeting in the
Netherlands. They reflect their understanding of how international law has evolved since
the adoption in 1986 of the Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the ICESCR,
considered an authoritative guide of State obligations under the ICESR. See Limburg
Principles on the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 43rd Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.411987/17 (1987), reprinted in 9 HuM. RTS. Q. 122 (1987).
26. Maastricht Guidelines, supra note 25, para. 6. Other terms used include the
obligations to "ensure" rights, see, e.g., ICESCR, supra note 5, arts. 3, 8(1), 11(2)(b), and
"respect" rights, see, e.g., ICESCR, supra note 5, arts. 1(3), 13(3), 15(3). See generally
Philip Alston & Asbjorn Eide, Advancing the Right to Food in International Law, in FOOD
AS A HUMAN RIGHT 249 (Asbjorn Eide et al. eds., 1984) (discussing State obligations to
respect, protect, and fulfill in the context of the right to food); Henry Shue, The
Interdependence of Duties, in THE RIGHT TO FOOD, supra note 24, at 83 (discussing the
duties to aid, fulfill, and promote rights). For a rebuttal of the view that economic, social,
and cultural rights have a second class status to civil and political rights, see G.J.H. van
Hoof, The Legal Nature of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: a Rebuttal of Some
Traditional Views, in THE RIGHT TO FOOD, supra note 24, at 97.
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and other measures toward the full realization of these rights.27
According to the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social 10
and Cultural Rights, entrusted with interpreting the ICESCR, States
are obliged "to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum
essential levels of each of the rights" enshrined in the ICESCR.28 This
means that if "any significant number of individuals is deprived of
essential foodstuffs, of essential primary health care, of basic shelter
and housing, or of the most basic forms of education," a State is, prima
facie, in violation of its obligations with respect to economic and social
rights. 29 As the Committee has stated, "If the Covenant were to be read
in such a way as not to establish such a minimum core obligation, it
would largely be deprived of its raison d'dtre."30
States, however, are required to go further than simply ensuring
minimum essential levels of economic, social, and cultural rights: the
ICESCR requires that States undertake immediate measures "to
achiev[e] progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in"
the Covenant. 31 To this end, each State is obligated to use "the
maximum of its available resources."3 2 Through this provision, the
ICESCR sets a priority on how countries are to use their resources.
While States have a "margin of discretion in selecting the means for
implementing their respective obligations," 33 States must prioritize
human rights; their discretion does not extend to the discretion to not
fulfill these obligations.
States in which large segments of the population are denied 12
effective access to education, basic health services, nutrition, housing,
and safe drinking water are States in which not even the minimal
essential levels of economic and social rights are satisfied. These States
are not meeting their minimum core obligations under international
law.
Such States include the HIPC countries. Average life expectancy in 13
these countries is a mere fifty-one years-twelve years less than in
developing countries overall, and twenty-six years less than in the more
developed countries of the world.34 As UNICEF reports:
The under-five mortality rate [in the HIPC countries] averages
156 per 1000 live births. This translates into 3.4 million deaths
annually, most of them resulting from infectious diseases which
could be averted through low-cost interventions .... There are
27. See Maastricht Guidelines, supra note 25, para.6.
28. General Comment No. 3, supra note 6, para. 10.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. ICESCR, supra note 5, art. 2(1).
32. Id. (emphasis added).
33. Maastricht Guidelines, supra note 25, para. 8.
34. See UNICEF & Oxfam Int'l, Debt relief and poverty reduction: Meeting the
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some 47 million primary school-aged children out of school ....
[and a]bout half of all households lack access to safe water and
sanitation.35
14 These human rights violations are closely tied to the issues of debt
and debt relief. By insisting on debt service payments, creditors deprive
HIPC countries of the resources they need to satisfy even minimal
levels of human rights, much less to progress beyond these levels. The
tens and hundreds of millions of dollars (and more) that countries spend
annually on debt service could go a long way toward realization of a
minimum core of human rights, and could put countries on their way to
going beyond this minimum. Creditor nations and institutions are not
passive observers of these human rights violations, but active (if
unintending) participants. In other words, these human rights
violations are occurring, in part, because of the debt service demands of
the more developed nations.
15 By diverting resources to creditor countries and institutions, debtor
nations are not able to use "all available resources" to move toward the
full realization of economic and social rights. It could be argued that
money an indebted country owes another country or institution is a
resource not to be included in "the maximum of its available resources"
that must be used to ensure the full realization of economic and social
rights of the people in the impoverished country. That interpretation of
available resources, however, would imply that States have a greater
duty to meet their obligations with respect to debts than they have to
meet their obligations with respect to the very lives of their people. This
perverse implication denies the centrality of human rights to
international law, a place secured by the Charter of the United
Nations.36
16 Indeed, if the view that States must sooner repay their debts than
meet their people's human rights were to be taken to its logical
conclusion, States would have a stronger obligation to repay their debts
than to realize even a minimal level of human rights for their people.
This cannot be correct. As the U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights has affirmed, a State not satisfying these minimal
levels "is, prima facie, failing to discharge its obligations under the
Covenant." 37 It is doubtful that the Committee would have said this had
international law required States to pay off debts before they sought to
meet the minimum levels of human rights.
17 Debt obligations are not necessarily the primary obstacle to social
35. Id.
36. See U.N. CHARTER, arts. 1(3) (identifying one of purposes of U.N. as "promoting
and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion"), 55 ("T]he United Nations shall
promote: ... universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.").
37. General Comment No. 3, supra note 6, para. 10.
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spending in every poor country; other resource allocation decisions also
affect the realization of human rights. One of the HIPC countries,
Ethiopia, at war with Eritrea, spent about $380 million purchasing
arms in 1999.38 Spent otherwise, that money could have gone a long
way toward meeting Ethiopia's minimum core obligations with respect
to such rights as the right to free primary education, the right to be free
from hunger, and the right of access to health care. 39
Large debt burdens do, however, facilitate human rights violations 18
in many countries. In Tanzania, one of the world's most impoverished
countries, 40 the military budget is small: $21 million in fiscal year
1998-99. 41 Yet fifty-one percent of its people do not have access to safe
drinking water, one-third of its children do not attend primary school,
and the life expectancy is forty-eight years. Tanzania's debt service
payments in 1998 totaled $158 million, 42 money that could have been
spent to provide greater access to potable water, primary schooling, and
health services for the impoverished population.
It is possible for the HIPC countries to have their debts cancelled 19
through a well-implemented system that will ensure that millions of
people who at present are persistently denied human rights will be
denied those rights no longer. Indeed, if money is owed by poor nations
to rich nations through certain legal obligations, the latter have a
certain leverage over what becomes of that money, including the ability
to use it to enhance the enjoyment of human rights. The absence of a
well-designed and well-implemented debt relief plan to achieve this
end, although proven to be eminently achievable, 43 facilitates the
continuation of violations of the basic rights to health, education, and
other economic and social rights. While the absence of debt relief is not
the only factor contributing to such violations-military spending and
government corruption, among others, may also be major factors-it is
an important one. As the Maastricht Guidelines affirm, moreover, "The
38. See Background: Drought Fails to Stop Ethiopia-Eritrea Arms Race, Deutsche
Presse-Agentur, Apr. 12, 2000, available in LEXIS, News Library, Deutsche Presse-
Agentur File. Eritrea is reported to have spent $236 million on arms in 1999. See id.
39. Ethiopia acceded to the ICESCR on June 11, 1993. See U.N. Treaty Collection,
Status of Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General: International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (visited Apr. 5, 2000) <http://untreaty.
un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partI/chapterIV/treaty4.asp> (password
required). All HIPC countries except Burma (Myanmar), Ghana, Lao People's Democratic
Republic, Liberia, Mauritania, Mozambique, Sdo Tom6 and Principe, and Tanzania are
parties to the ICESCR. See id.
40. More than half of Tanzania's people live below the poverty line, with an estimated
GNP per capita of $246 in 1998. See IMF & INT'L DEV. ASS'N, TANZANIA, supra note 13, at
1, para. 3.
41. See CIA, The World Factbook 1999: Tanzania (visited Apr. 4, 2000) <http://www.
cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/tz.html>. •
42. See WORLD BANK, TANZANIA AT A GLANCE 2 (1999), available at
<http://www.worldbank.org/data/countrydata/aag/tza aag.pdf>. Statistics on access to
safe water, primary school enrollment, and life expectancy are from the latest year
available, 1992-98.
43. See infra Part III.
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failure to ... put into effect policies designed to implement provisions of
the Covenant" is a violation of economic, social, and cultural rights.44
II. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF DEBT RELIEF PLANS
20 The first significant movement on debt relief came at a G7 summit
in 1994, when the leading industrialized nations agreed to a two-thirds
reduction of bilateral debt, that is, debt that the HIPC countries owed
individual G7 countries. 45 The debt relief was contingent, however,
upon stringent and prolonged economic reforms that many countries
would not or could not meet, considerably limiting the value of the
plan.46
21 In 1996, the World Bank, the IMF, and creditor nations embarked
on the HIPC Initiative.4 7 This initiative increased the bilateral debt
relief to eighty percent and introduced multilateral debt relief.48 The
HIPC Initiative created a special Trust Fund, administered by the
World Bank, which provides debt relief to eligible HIPC countries on
debt owed to certain multilateral institutions.49 The World Bank and
over a dozen donor States contributed to this Trust Fund.50 Meanwhile,
in 1997 the IMF created the ESAF-HIPC Trust, which extended grants
and loans to eligible HIPC countries, and subsidized the interest rate on
loans made as part of the IMF's structural adjustment programs.
Funding for this trust came directly from donors and from the IMF's
Special Disbursement Account and its General Resources Account. 51
22 The biggest obstacle to significant progress through the HIPC
Initiative echoed that of the 1994 G7 summit agreement: Debt relief
was conditional upon IMF-structured economic reforms, which have
proven difficult to implement, largely because of their political
unpopularity among domestic constituencies. 52 Indeed, these reforms
often hurt the poor. Common features include requiring governments to
end subsidies on basic goods, making them less affordable to the poor 53;
44. Maastricht Guidelines, supra note 25, para. 15(c).





49. See World Bank, HIPC Initiative, supra note 9.
50. See 1999 WORLD BANK ANN. REP. 14, this section available at <http://www.
worldbank.org/htmllextpb/annrep/pdfar99_6.pdf>. The African Development Bank Group
was also an important contributor to the Fund. See id.
51. See IMF, IMF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS: QUARTER ENDED APRIL 30, 1999, at 52,
available at <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/quart1999fy/043099.pdf>. ESAF is the
Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility, which was the IMls mechanism for managing
structural adjustment programs.
52. See Jubilee 2000/USA, HIPC: The Official Debt Relief Program (visited Apr. 4,
2000) <http://www.j2000usa.org/debtledpac/hipc.html> [hereinafter Jubilee 2000/USA,
HIPC]J.
53. See, e.g., Christopher S. Wren, Even the Best of Times Are Tough in Zambia, N.Y.
TIMES, May 29, 1989, at A36 (referring to Zambia's December 1986 riots that occurred
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to cut budgets, which translates into a reduction in public expenditures;
and to privatize state-run enterprises, which reduces employment. 54
Moreover, in order to qualify for bilateral debt relief, countries were
required to implement IMF reforms for three years, and only after up to
three more years of these reforms would they receive the debt relief.55
Along with the burden and conditions of IMF reforms, the 23
definitions of "poor" and "heavily indebted" were restrictive, preventing
many countries that in fact required debt relief from being eligible.
Ultimately, only twenty-six of the then-forty-one HIPC countries
themselves were eligible.5 6 Furthermore, the goals of the program were
narrow, as high levels of debt service were considered to be
"sustainable," and thus acceptable. 57 Through 1999, only four
countries-Uganda, Bolivia, Guyana, and Mozambique-had actually
received debt relief, with relief levels set but not yet acted upon for
several other countries. 58
III. DEBT RELIEF CAN WORK
Despite the obstacles to implementation, the experience of the 1996 24
HIPC Initiative has proven that debt relief can work. The ability of debt
relief to lead directly to human rights improvements-as well as
important insights into how debt relief can bring about poverty
reduction-is best seen in Uganda, which in March 1998 became the
first country to receive relief under the 1996 HIPC Initiative.
In 1997, only about fifty-four percent of children in Uganda 25
attended primary school. 59 The access of millions of children to primary
education was impeded by State-required school fees, which their
parents could not afford. Uganda used much of its early debt relief
savings to cancel the school fees for up to four children per family.60 By
1999, attendance had risen to ninety percent.
61
Beyond its success in using debt relief to boost primary school 26
attendance, Uganda's debt relief program presents several other
when President Kenneth D. Kaunda sought to double the price of cornmeal as part of the
IMF's economic reform plan).
54. See, e.g., Chakravarthi Raghavan, Third World Network, Failed Expectations of
SAPs, Liberalization (visited Apr. 4, 2000) <http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/saps-ch.htm>.
55. See Jubilee 2000/USA, HIPC, supra note 52.
56. See Morrison, supra note 9.
57. See Jubilee 2000/USA, HIPC, supra note 52.
58. See Gordon Brown, Duty to the Neediest, Op-Ed, WASH. POST, Sept. 26, 1999, at
B7. See also IMF, Debt Initiative for the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs) (visited
Apr. 4, 2000) <http://www.imf.org/external/nphipc/hipc.htm>.
59. See Out of the Debt Trap, Opinion, INT'L HERALD TRIB., May 4, 1999, at 8.
60. See IMF & INT'L DEV. ASS'N, UGANDA: INITIATIVE FOR HEAVILY INDEBTED POOR
COUNTRIES SECOND DECISION POINT DOCUMENT 19 n.7 (2000), available at <http://www.
worldbank.org/hipc/Uganda.pdf> [hereinafter IMF & INT'L DEV. ASS'N, UGANDA].
61. See Out of the Debt Trap, supra note 59. This increase has meant an additional 2
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instructive links between debt relief and poverty reduction. All of the
budget savings from debt relief-nearly $40 million per year-were
placed in a Poverty Action Fund. Uganda has allocated the money in
this fund not only to education, allowing it to cancel the primary school
fees, but also to rural roads, agricultural extension, water supply, and
primary health care. These areas received priority under a Poverty
Eradication Action Plan, which was developed over a two-year period
with much popular support. To help assure that the Poverty Action
Fund money is properly used, the money that flows into and out of the
fund is reported every quarter, an independent audit is published
annually, and non-governmental organizations are involved in
overseeing the use of the funds. The Ugandan Parliament is also
involved in ensuring that new lending is based on solid strategy and is
in accord with national development priorities.62 Beyond making it
probable that the poverty eradication strategy will focus on what people
really need, the wide involvement in this process, including that of the
government, along with the careful monitoring of the plan, help ensure
that the additional social spending from the Poverty Action Fund is not
countered and rendered meaningless by reductions in regular
government spending.
27 Without the direct connection between the money freed by debt
relief and a specific fund, it is more difficult to judge the effect of debt
relief on poverty reduction and human rights fulfillment. Bolivia, for
example, beginning in September 1998, became the second HIPC
country to receive debt relief.63 Its social spending significantly
increased thereafter, despite the Latin American financial crisis,
suggesting that debt relief may have played an important part in the
increase. From the end of 1998 through 1999, Bolivia received a total of
$103 million in debt relief; social spending rose by $115 million in 1999,
a nine percent increase over the previous year.64 The relation between
the increased social spending and debt relief, however, is difficult to
tease out. Social spending had, after all, already been on the rise in
Bolivia, both in absolute terms and as a percentage of GDP. Social
spending rose steadily from 12.4 percent of GDP in 1995 to an
estimated 16.1 percent in 1999.65
28 How has the increased social spending in Bolivia translated into
human rights improvements? There were slight increases in general
health spending, with a significant improvement in access to treatment
for acute respiratory infections through the Mother and Child
62. See Jubilee 2000/USA, How Can Debt Cancellation Benefit People? (visited Apr. 4,
2000) <http://www.j2O0Ousa.org/debt/uganda.html>.
63. Guyana and Mozambique were the final two countries to receive debt relief in the
1990s, in May and June 1999, respectively. However, at the time of this writing, there is
little data on what in fact happened with the money freed by debt relief.
64. See IMF & INT'L DEV. AS'N, BOLIVIA: DECISION POINT DOCUMENT FOR THE
ENHANCED HEAVILY INDEBTED POOR COUNTRIES (HIPC) INITIATIVE 5, para. 12 & n.4
(2000), available at <http://www.worldbank.org/hipc/Bolivia.pdf>.
65. See id. at 19 tbl.2.
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Insurance Program. Perhaps the most significant improvement in the
past few years in the social arena came in the increased number of
beneficiaries of water and sanitation projects in rural areas-from
132,000 before 1997 to over 216,000 by the end of 1998.66 Increased
water and sanitation projects in rural areas was not, however, one of
the social progress targets established as part of Bolivia's involvement
in the HIPC Initiative. At the same time, most of this increase occurred
before Bolivia had received debt relief, making its connection to debt
relief tenuous. Access to education for boys and girls in rural areas also
increased, but its link to the debt relief plan is also not clear.67
The effect of HIPC debt relief is, therefore, far less clear in Bolivia 29
than it is in Uganda. Indeed, Bolivia offers no clear way of determining
how the money that would have been spent on debt relief was actually
used, and less time has elapsed since Bolivia received debt relief. While
a narrow range of social services did improve, the link between these
improvements and debt relief is questionable. The contrast between
Uganda and Bolivia strongly suggests that the manner in which a
country implements a debt relief plan will have a large impact on the
extent to which debt relief leads to decreased poverty and increased
enjoyment of human rights.
It is also important to recognize that even as debt relief has had a 30
very palpable effect on human rights improvement in Uganda, it is only
part of the solution. One of the crucial elements of Uganda's successful
use of debt reduction to reduce poverty and its associated indignities
has its own drawbacks. The extensive administrative efforts needed for
the monitoring and conditions that assure the money is properly spent
limit the ability of some local governments to access and utilize the
Poverty Action Fund money. 68 Meanwhile, the proportion of Ugandans
in absolute poverty remains near one-half, and life expectancy in
Uganda dropped to forty-two years in 1998. The decrease in life
expectancy is attributable to HIV/AIDS, although infection rates are
now falling, largely due to an aggressive AIDS prevention program.69
The Ugandan government does not pay for school supplies such as
uniforms, notebooks and pencils, and some children do not remain in
school because they cannot afford these items. 70 Classrooms are
overcrowded, and absenteeism among teachers is a problem.7 1 In the
realm of health care, despite increased expenditures, selected
immunization rates are falling, half of households surveyed do not use
available health clinics when they are ill, and nearly two-thirds of staff
66. See id.
67. It has been reported that much of the reported increase was due to changes in the
Ministry of Education's reporting methods. See id. app. 1, at 42 tbl.2.
68. See IMF & INT'L DEV. ASS'N, UGANDA, supra note 60, at 16 para. 15.
69. See id. at 8, para. 6. The absolute poverty rate stood at 44 percent in 1996-97, a
six percent drop from 1994-95. See id. at 9 tbl.3.
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positions in the clinics are unfilled.72
The experience of Uganda demonstrates that debt relief can have a
substantial effect on human rights and poverty reduction. The new
1999 debt relief initiative, described in Part IV below, will further
increase Uganda's debt relief; Uganda will receive $40-50 million more
annually in debt relief under the new initiative than it would have
received under the 1996 HIPC Initiative. 73 The additional money,
which, thanks to Uganda's Poverty Action Fund, should go directly to
poverty reduction programs, should lead to further human rights
improvements in Uganda. Combined, the two initiatives could reduce
Uganda's debt service by about two-thirds, possibly more. Over its first
three years, the new initiative should free money equivalent to
approximately ten percent of Uganda's projected social spending. This
money will go into the Poverty Action Fund. 74
IV. THE 1999 ENHANCED HIPC INITIATIVE
32 In June 1999, at the G7 meeting in Cologne, Germany, the leading
industrialized nations agreed to expand the HIPC debt relief program.
Members of the G7 touted the new agreement, deemed the Enhanced
HIPC Initiative, as a very significant achievement. France's President
Jacques Chirac said that the effort could relieve $65 billion of debt. 75
Gene Sperling, President Clinton's chief economic advisor, said that this
number could reach $90 billion if countries outside of the G7 joined in
theenterprise.76 G7 attendees identified a total of $127 billion in HIPC
debt; if the plan works, about seventy percent of this debt will be
relieved.77
33 Whether this second HIPC initiative will actually lead to
meaningful debt relief and significant poverty reduction is not nearly as
certain as these numbers suggest. 78 Only thirty-three of the forty HIPC
countries are expected to be eligible for relief under this program. At
the same time, while total HIPC debt is about $207 billion,79 the
initiative recognizes HIPC debt as only $127 billion.8 0
34 The estimated thirty-three countries eligible for the new initiative
is an increase over the twenty-six countries eligible under the previous
72. See id.
73. See id. at 44, para. 59.
74. See id. at 44, para. 61.
75. See Cohen, supra note 3.
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. This analysis of the structure Enhanced HIPC Initiative is based largely on
Morrison, supra note 9, and Jubilee 2000 Coalition, Details and Interpretation of the Kln
Debt Initiative (visited Apr. 4, 2000) <http://www.jubilee2000uk.org/news/kolndebt.html>
[hereinafter Jubilee 2000 Coalition, Details and Interpretation].
79. See supra text accompanying note 8.
80. See Morrison, supra note 9.
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initiative, this increase due to less restrictive eligibility requirements.1
Countries are eligible if they have what the IMF and World Bank deem
an unsustainable debt, determined by ratios comparing the net present
value of the debt8 2 to a revenue measure. For some countries the
relevant ratio is debt-to-export earnings, while for others the debt-to-
government revenue ratio is used. Under the 1996 plan, for those
countries for which the debt-to-export earnings ratio determined
eligibility, the ratio had to be at least in the 200-250 percent range and,
for those countries for which the debt-to-government revenue ratio
determined eligibility, the ratio had to be at least 280 percent. The 1999
plan lowers these ratios to 150 percent and 250 percent, respectively,
making an additional seven countries eligible for debt relief8 3 A country
can now be eligible with a debt level that, under the 1996 plan, would
have been deemed sustainable, and thus too low to warrant relief.
As with the original HIPC Initiative, however, a country that is 3s
eligible for debt relief under the Enhanced HIPC Initiative still must
qualify. In order to qualify, a country must undergo IMF-designed
economic reforms. These reforms have been promulgated under the
umbrella of the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF),
which, following the Enhanced HIPC Initiative, has had its name
changed to the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF).84
While these economic reforms vary somewhat from country to 36
country, they share similar objectives: "raising saving rates, securing
financial stability, liberalizing and opening economies to foreign trade,
reducing State intervention and making markets more efficient,
reorienting government spending and improving revenue collection, and
81. Technically, 29 countries met the eligibility requirements for the 1996 HIPC
Initiative, and 36 countries are eligible under the 1999 Enhanced HIPC Initiative.
However, three of the countries in each case-Liberia, Somalia. and Sudan-are not
expected to meet the reform requirements for a number of years, and so are generally
excluded from the tally. See Oxfam Int'l, Halfway there? G-7 must now make debt
agreement work for the poorest (visited Apr. 4, 2000) <http://www.oxfam.org/advocacy/
papers/halfway.htm>. Including these three countries, the 29 countries that would qualify
under both plans are Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Burma (Myanmar), Burundi, Cameroon ,
Chad, Republic of Congo, C6te d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Guinea,
Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi , Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique,
Nicaragua, Niger, Rwanda, Sao Tomb and Principe, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan,
Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia. The seven additional countries expected to qualify under the
1999 initiative are Benin, Central African Republic, Ghana, Honduras, Lao People's
Democratic Republic, Senegal, and Togo. See IMF, Modifications to the Heavily Indebted
Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative (visited Apr. 4, 2000) <http://www.imf.org/externalnp/
hipc/modify/hipc.htm> [hereinafter IMF, Modifications].
82. The net present value of the debt is what countries would have to pay if they were
to pay off their entire debt today; this number is about 54 percent of the total nominal
debt. See Morrison, supra note 9.
83. See id.
84. See IMF, Overview: Transforming the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility
(ESAF) and the Debt Initiative for the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs) (visited
Apr. 4, 2000) <http://www.imf.org/external/np/esafhipc/1999/index.htm> [hereinafter IMF,
Overview]. The structural adjustment programs were called the Structural Adjustment
Facility (SAY) when established in 1986, then changed to the ESAF a year later.
2000]
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mobilizing external resources."8 5 To accomplish these aims, many of the
structural adjustment programs have common features. These include
cutting budget deficits by reducing government spending and increasing
tax revenue (especially by broad-based consumption taxes),
deregulating pricing mechanisms, devaluing currency and liberalizing
the exchange rate, reforming and privatizing state-run enterprises,
reforming the banking system, developing financial markets, and
promoting more transparent economic systems.8 6
37 G7 countries argue that these economic reforms are important to
ensure that the money that debt relief makes available is well spent.8 7
It is thus open to question how many of the eligible countries will
actually qualify. Countries that do successfully implement these
economic reforms will, however, receive relief from the IMF and World
Bank sooner than they would have under the 1996 HIPC Initiative.
Under the 1996 plan, countries had to complete two ESAF programs,
each of which would last three years, before they could get relief from
the IMF and World Bank; now, the multilateral lending institutions
will provide interim debt relief after a country completes one three-year
round of economic reform.88
38 Even for those countries that manage to qualify for debt relief under
this program, it is not clear how meaningful the relief will in fact be.
Since the debt of many of these countries is so high, the countries are
unable to service their entire debt, so they service the debt only to
certain creditors. "[D]onors acknowledge that much of it will never be
repaid. Therefore, 'forgiving' it is essentially an accounting exercise."8 9
How much the debt reduction affects debt service payments largely
depends on how the forgiven debt is distributed.
39 The key question is how much of the forgiven debt is owed to
creditors to whom a given country is actually making debt service
payments, and how much is owed to creditors to whom no payments are
being made. Only in the former context will debt relief have real
meaning. The actual cost of the debt relief plan, given that much of the
debt has, for all practical purposes, already been written off, is expected
to be about $27 billion.90 Proponents of the Enhanced HIPC Initiative
85. World Bank, World Economy in Transition: Experience Under the IMF's Enhanced
Structural Adjustment Facility (visited Apr. 4, 2000) <http://www.worldbank.org/fanddl




88. In addition to the three years of economic reform, States will be required to draft a
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper in order to be eligible for interim debt relief. See World
Bank, HIPC Debt Initiative: Flow Chart (visited Apr. 4, 2000) <http://www.worldbank.org/
hipc/about/FLOWCHRT4.pdf>. See also infra text accompanying note 117.
89. See Morrison, supra note 9.
90. See Jubilee 2000 Coalition, Details and Interpretation. supra note 78. This is the
net present value of the anticipated cost; the nominal cost is $50 billion. The World
Bank's estimate in net present value is $28 billion. See World Bank, HIPC Initiative,
supra note 9.
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argue that even though the revised plan still concerns itself with the
total amount of debt, as opposed to the debt service itself, the deeper
cuts in the total debt will affect the debt service. 91
Another change in the HIPC plan involves bilateral debts. Under 40
the 1996 plan, G7 countries were to forgive up to eighty percent of the
bilateral commercial debt of qualifying countries. Under the 1999
revision, that number will rise to ninety percent, and possibly more in
certain cases. 92 Most of the more developed countries had, by 1999,
already completely forgiven debts that arose from Official Development
Assistance. The Enhanced HIPC Initiative calls upon those creditor
countries that have not fully forgiven debt that arose from development
aid to do so. 93
How will multilateral institutions pay for debt relief? The Enhanced
HIPC Initiative envisions several mechanisms by which multilateral
institutions will finance debt relief. It mandates that donor
governments contribute to an HIPC Trust Fund94 and creates a
Millennium Fund, to which the private sector can contribute. The
initiative also calls for the sale of ten million ounces of gold from the
IMF's reserves to raise money.95
Since the Cologne meeting, the G7 countries have moved toward 42
completely forgiving the bilateral debts of debtor countries, going
beyond their pledges under the Enhanced HIPC Initiative. Indeed, even
before the Cologne meeting, in March 1999, Canada committed itself to
complete bilateral debt relief for eligible heavily indebted nations, and
urged other G7 countries to do the same. 96 And in October 1999,
Canada pledged to completely cancel the debt owed to it by Bangladesh.
Though the amount was small-$600,000-the action was noteworthy
because Bangladesh, though a highly impoverished nation, had not
been designated a HIPC country. 97
91. See Morrison, supra note 9.
92. See University of Toronto G8 Info. Ctr., Report of G7 Finance Ministers on the
K6ln Debt Initiative to the Kdln Economic Summit paras. 12-13 (visited Apr. 4, 2000)
<http://www.library.utoronto.ca/g7/finance/fmO 6 1 8 9 9 .htm>.
93. See id. para. 13.
94. The HIPC Trust Fund will primarily pay for debt owed to the Inter-American
Development Bank and the African Development Bank. See Lisa Wright, Jubilee
2000/USA, December 1999 Legislative Update (visited Apr. 4, 2000) <http://www.
j2000usa.org/updates/lisa.html>.
95. See Jubilee 2000/USA, Overview of G7 June 1999 Debt Relief Initiative (visited
Apr. 4, 2000) <http://www.j2000usa.org/debt/cologne.html> [hereinafter Jubilee
2000/USA, Overview].
96. See Jean Chrdtien, Address to a luncheon of the Canadian Club of Winnipeg (Mar.
25, 1999) available at <http://pm.gc.ca/default.asp?Language = e&Page
= publications&
Sub=Speeches&Doc=speeches99 9 0 3 2 595 7_e.htm>.
97. See Jubilee 2000 Coalition, Canada cancels 100% of bilateral debt owed by
Bangladesh (visited Apr. 4, 2000) <http://www.jubilee2000uk.org/news/canadalOl
2
.
html>. According to Canada's Finance Minister, Paul Martin, Bangladesh was chosen
because of "Bangladesh's track record in implementing reforms that benefit its people,
and the priority given to poverty reduction by the government of Prime Minister Sheikh
Hasina, [which made] Bangladesh an appropriate candidate for the new Canadian Debt
Initiative." Id. Also, the "series of devastating floods [Bangladesh has suffered through] in
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43 In September 1999, the United States began a similar initiative.
President Clinton proposed that the United States fully forgive the
bilateral debt owed it by thirty-six HIPC countries. 98 The face value of
this debt is about $5 billion, but since most of this money has already
been written off as never to be repaid, the debt relief will cost the
United States approximately $970 million.99 President Clinton planned
on funding the debt relief through a three-year effort, 10 0 hoping to have
Congress approve $370 million in debt relief for the year 2000 budget.1 01
44 Congress initially offered a mere $33 million in debt relief The
Clinton Administration was able to increase that figure somewhat in
the final budget, but only to $123 million, still far less than the
President had hoped. 102 Of this sum, $110 million is for bilateral debt
relief, with the balance of the money going to a debt-for-nature tropical
rainforest conservation program. 103
Congress and the President also compromised in an area of
multilateral debt relief. One key element of the Enhanced HIPC
Initiative involves the IMF raising money through transactions
involving its gold reserves. The IMF planned on using gold transactions
as its primary mechanism for paying its share of the debt relief because
the Fund's charter forbids it from forgiving debts outright. 10 4 Of the $27
billion that the HIPC debt relief is expected to cost, the IMF's share will
be about $2.1 billion. 105 Since IMF rules require that eighty-five percent
of its ownership shares must approve the gold revaluation that would
be central to the gold transactions, and the United States holds
seventeen percent of the shares, the United States has veto power over
the revaluation.10 6
46 Meeting a concern of many in Congress, the IMF changed its plan to
sell gold, coming up instead with a gold transaction and revaluation
plan that would not affect the market value of gold.10 7 After prolonged
recent years" played a role in its inclusion in Canada's debt relief program. Id.
98. See Unburdening the Third World, Editorial. N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1999, at A26.
99. See Michael Grunwald, GOP's Bachus Makes Debt Relief His Mission, WASH.
POST, Oct. 9, 1999, at A3.
100. See id.
101. See Eric Schmitt, House Passes Compromise Bill for $13.5 Billion in Foreign Aid,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1999, at A7.
102. See Schmitt, supra note 101.
103. See Wright, supra note 94. Through this program, money goes to Tropical Forest
Funds in beneficiary countries. Such funds give grants to conserve, maintain, and restore
tropical forests. See Tropical Forest Conservation Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-214, 112
Stat. 885 (1998) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2151 n.,§§ 2431-2431h (2000)).
104. See Paul Blustein, IMP Crafts New Plan for Using Its Gold, WASH. POST, Sept. 8,
1999, at E3.
105. See Gold Comfort, ECONOMIST, Oct. 2, 1999, at 81.
106. See John Burgess & Helen Dewar, Congress's Inaction Holds Up Debt Relief,
WASH. POST, Nov. 12, 1999, at E3.
107. See IMF. News Brief No. 99/62 (visited Apr. 4, 2000) <http://www.imf org/
external/np/secnb/1999/NB9962.HTM>. According to the plan, the IMF would sell its
highly undervalued gold to a member at the gold's market value. The IMF member State
would immediately pay for the gold with this very gold by returning it to the IMF.
However, upon the return, the IMF would value the gold not at the artificially low value
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negotiations, Congress agreed to this action, with the restriction that in
the first year, only sixty percent of the profits would immediately
become available for debt relief. Pending further congressional review,
the other forty percent could also become available. 108 In mid-December
1999, with the cooperation of Brazil, the first of these transactions,
involving seven million ounces of gold, took place. 109
Congress did not compromise at all in terms of U.S. funding for the 47
HIPC Trust Fund, the multilateral government-funded debt relief fund.
The Clinton Administration had asked for $210 million for the Fund;
Congress would not authorize even a single dollar.110 This is
regrettable. It is important that the money to pay for debt relief is
rapidly forthcoming if the total debt reductions are to translate into
significant debt service payment reductions.1 1
As 1999 drew to a close, Britain became the third G7 country to
announce that it was forgiving all of its debt to the poorest, heavily
indebted countries. This debt had a face value of $8 billion. Like the
United States, Britain's debt relief will cost the British far less than the
debt's nominal value, and the relief is conditional on the indebted
countries' meeting HIPC eligibility and economic reform criteria.
112
Britain quickly cancelled the bilateral debt of four countries: Bolivia,
Mauritania, Mozambique, and Uganda. The debt of up to seven more
countries could be cancelled after the IMF's April 2000 meeting.11 3 Italy
has also agreed to completely cancel the debt of eighteen countries, and
in late February 2000, the Italian Prime Minister Massimo D'Alema
promised to consider doubling this figure. 114 In early April 2000, the
remaining three G7 countries-France, Germany, and Japan-all
agreed to cancel 100 percent of the bilateral debts that most or all of the
HIPC countries owed them. 1 15
that was previously in the IMF's books, but rather at the market price. Thus, on paper,
the IMF will have made a large profit from the sale-the difference between the market
value and the artificially low value-though in reality, nothing will have changed. The
IMF would then invest this profit, and use the returns on the investment to fund debt
relief. In this way, the IMF would revalue up to 14 million ounces of its gold.
108. See John Burgess, Deal Will Allow IMF to Fund Debt Relief, WASH. POST, Nov.
17, 1999, at E2.
109. See IMF, News Brief No. 99/84 (visited Apr. 4, 2000) <http://www.imf.org/
externa1Inp/sec/nb/1999/NB9984.HTM>.
110. See Wright, supra note 94.
111. See infra text accompanying note 133.
112. See Do You Believe in Fairies? ECONOMIST, Dec. 23, 1999, at 3, available at
<http://www.economist.com/editorial/freeforall/19991 2 2 5/index -d2100.html>.
113. See Julian Lee, Finance: British Debt Relief Called 'A Drop in the Ocean," INTER
PRESS SERVICE, Dec. 22, 1999, available in LEXIS, News Library, Inter Press Service
File. The seven countries are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cbte d'Ivoire, Guyana, Mali, Senegal,
and Tanzania. See id.
114. See Jubilee 2000 Coalition, San Remo Festival forces Italian Government to
respond to appeal for debt cancellation (visited Apr. 4, 2000) <http://www.jubilee2000uk.
org/news/italy230200.html>.
115. See Jubilee 2000 Coalition, G7 all promise 100% cancellation-but debt relief is
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Significantly, then, all G7 countries have pledged some form of
complete bilateral debt cancellation, though the conditions that
countries must meet in order to qualify vary, in some cases linked to
qualification requirements for the Enhanced HIPC Initiative. As of
early April 2000, only one G7 creditor, Britain, had in fact delivered on
its pledge of complete debt cancellation, and that to only one country,
Mauritania. 116
50 Beyond deepening the debt relief, the Enhanced HIPC Initiative
focuses more than its predecessor on the true objective of debt relief: not
merely to change economic statistics, but rather to change-to better-
lives by reducing poverty. In order to strengthen this link between debt
relief and poverty reduction, the IMF and World Bank have proposed
making debt relief part of a broader poverty reduction program.
Government officials of each HIPC country, collaborating with World
Bank and IMF officials, will draft a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper.
The papers will "identify the key obstacles to poverty reduction...
formulate appropriate policies, and specify mechanisms for monitoring
and policy adaptation." They will also outline macroeconomic policies
consistent with social goals.117 At least in theory, then, the poverty
reduction framework will help ensure that countries are not bringing
budgets under control by cutting spending on health, education, and
other important social investments.
One of the key principles underlying the poverty reduction
strategies is broad public participation in developing poverty reduction
strategies-including not only officials from the international financial
institutions 18 and debtor governments, but also NGOs, academics, and
the private sector. Another principle is that poverty reduction requires
rapid economic growth, macroeconomic stability, structural reforms,
and social stability.119
.32 The latter principle, however, risks undermining the first. By
determining that rapid economic growth and structural adjustments
are necessary for poverty reduction, 120 the IMF limits the acceptable
dimensions of the goal of broad participation. Apparently, traditional
economic measurements like GDP growth will continue to be seen as
central 2 ' and participation will have to take place within the IMF
116. See id.
117. See IMF, Overview, supra note 84.
118. Some people and organizations very reasonably question the central role of the
IMF in designing a plan to reduce poverty, given its poor track record on poverty
reduction. Criticism also comes from those who view the central role of the IMF and the
World Bank in the poverty reduction plan as paternalism. See Jubilee 2000/USA,
Overview, supra note 95.
119. See World Bank PovertyNet, Principles Underlying Poverty Reduction Strategies
(visited Apr. 4, 2000) <http://www.worldbank.org/poverty/strategies/principl.htm>.
120. In the words of one IMF document, "faster growth... is key to lasting poverty
reduction." IMF, Overview, supra note 84.
121. The IMF's overview of the 1999 HIPC initiative remarks "1995-98 data for
countries with ESAF-supported programs suggest that they are beginning to see real
payoffs from the reforms they have adopted." Id. The payoffs are in the form of an
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structural adjustment framework. Rapid GDP growth will, thus, be
considered movement in the right direction, even if that growth comes
at the expense of poverty reduction (perhaps in the name of long-term
benefits). Indeed, the IMF seems to take it for granted that there will be
harmful short-term negative effects; one of the objectives of the PRGF is
"better protecting the poor from any short-term negative effects of
economic adjustment and reform."122 Unless that protection is bolstered
by effective safety nets, these short-term negative effects may well
translate into deprivations of human rights.
The twin goals of the PRGF, as the name readily suggests, are
reducing poverty and increasing growth. According to the IMF, the
former, lasting poverty reduction, has "always been implicit" in the
structural adjustment programs. 123 The IMF will have a long way to go
in convincing the people of the countries that participate in its
programs that the IMF is serious in its concern about poverty reduction
and that it has the ability to play an important role in that reduction.
After all, the purposes stated in the Articles of Agreement of the
International Monetary Fund, the IMF's founding document, relate to
promoting international monetary stability and cooperation, facilitating
the growth of international trade, and reducing obstacles to that
trade-not to reducing poverty. 124
If poverty reduction has truly been an implicit goal of the ESAF, 54
increased per capita GDP growth in countries with ESAF-supported programs. See id.
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. Article 1 of the Articles of Agreement reads as follows:
The purposes of the International Monetary Fund are:
(i) To promote international monetary cooperation through a
permanent institution which provides the machinery for consultation
and collaboration on international monetary problems.
(ii) To facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of international
trade, and to contribute thereby to the promotion and maintenance of
high levels of employment and real income and to the development of
the productive resources of all members as primary objectives of
economic policy.
(iii) To promote exchange stability, to maintain orderly exchange
arrangements among members, and to avoid competitive exchange
depreciation.
(iv) To assist in the establishment of a multilateral system of
payments in respect of current transactions between members and in
the elimination of foreign exchange restrictions which hamper the
growth of world trade.
(v) To give confidence to members by making the general resources of
the Fund temporarily available to them under adequate safeguards,
thus providing them with opportunity to correct maladjustments in
their balance of payments without resorting to measures destructive
of national or international prosperity.
(vi) In accordance with the above, to shorten the duration and lessen
the degree of disequilibrium in the international balances of payments
of members.
Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, July. 22, 1944, art. 1, 2
U.N.T.S. 39, available at <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/aa.pdf>.
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moreover, it is a goal that the IMF has failed to achieve. According to a
World Bank review of structural adjustment programs, over the past
decade "[l]iving standards and social indicators improved in ESAF
countries, but more slowly than in the rest of the developing world."125
In order to realize its goal of reducing poverty, it would seem more
effective for the World Bank and IMF to measure countries'
performance by standards similar to those in the Human Development
Index (HDI), developed by the United Nations Development
Programme. Beyond looking at traditional economic statistics like GDP
per capita, 126 the HDI looks to such measures as life expectancy and the
adult literacy rate.1 27 There is no reason that the World Bank and IMF
should become wedded to these particular metrics, as others like infant
mortality or percent of population with access to safe drinking water
are also very important. Also, given the long-term perspective that the
World Bank agrees is necessary for a poverty reduction strategy, 28
measures related to the environment might also be developed and
included in the poverty reduction strategy's assessment. Rather than
aiming for rapid economic growth as a goal in and of itself, the type and
rate of economic growth could be adjusted to maximize these other
measures, which are much more genuine measures of poverty reduction
and human well-being than a country's GDP. Why focus on a proxy for
the object of true concern when that object can be directly measured?
The IMF and World Bank expect the PRGF to increase the
influence that poverty-reduction programs have on macroeconomic
policies, to increase the focus on good governance (especially
transparency and effective budget monitoring), and to make the plans
more responsive to social goals. 129 It remains to be seen'whether the
PRGF programs can become tools for reducing poverty, rather than
obstacles to that end. Some of the proposed revisions seem eminently
sensible and manageable, such as increasing spending in health and
education.
Nevertheless, the interactions of Mozambique with the IMF in June
1999 under the original HIPC Initiative demonstrate how much the
latter will have to reform its structural adjustment policies if it wishes
to promote poverty reduction. As part of the structural adjustment
conditions that accompanied the IMF's decision to increase debt relief to
Mozambique under the Enhanced HIPC Initiative, the IMF required
Mozambique to reduce the state subsidy for clean water and to give
priority to people who are able to pay for the water in rural areas by
125. World Bank, World Economy in Transition, supra note 85.
126. See supra note 119.
127. See UNDP, What Is Human Development: Glossary of Selected Terms (visited
Apr. 4, 2000) <http://www.undp.org/hdro/hd.htm> (also defining the Human Poverty
Index).
128. See World Bank PovertyNet, supra note 119 ("A medium- and long-term
perspective is needed ... ").
129. See IMF, Overview, supra note 84.
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2002.130 In a country as poor as Mozambique, this could leave many
people without safe water. 131
The experiences of Mozambique suggest that IMF practices have 58
not yet significantly changed. As one pro-debt relief organization put it,
"[t]he core macro-economic policies required by the IMF are currently
antithetical to poverty reduction and to democratic decision-making on
macro-economic policies."13 2 As indicated by the conditions imposed on
Mozambique in the waning era of the ESAF, the PRGF will be a friend
rather than an adversary of the poor only if it manages a profound
transformation of the policies of the ESAF.
V. ENHANCING THE ENHANCED HIPC INITIATIVE
Debt relief can work. The experiences of Uganda demonstrate that 59
debt relief can be a central factor in significant human rights
improvements in impoverished countries. Unfortunately, as it now
stands, the Enhanced HIPC Initiative has multiple shortcomings that
leave many outstanding questions about how much this approach to
debt relief will actually improve human rights. How many countries
will meet the structural adjustment requirements necessary to qualify
for debt relief? Will these requirements really be changed so they are
not in tension with human rights obligations? Will tens of millions of
dollars in debt service reductions in fact translate into tens of millions
of dollars of social spending increases? At the same time, although it is
"broader, deeper and faster" than the original HIPC Initiative, the new
initiative is neither broad enough, deep enough, nor fast enough to
prevent continued, severe human rights violations from occurring in
connection with the debt, even if the initiative works as planned.
There is genuine concern that the plan will not work as intended, 60
and that debt stock reduction will not in fact translate into debt service
reductions. Debt service will only be reduced if the debt forgiven is debt
that is in fact being serviced; a significant portion of it is not.
Furthermore, so far as the multilateral portion of the debt reduction is
concerned, it is very important that the private sector actually
contribute to the Millennium Fund created under the Enhanced HIPC
Initiative. During the Cologne meeting, a British government
"spokesperson said that the degree of debt service reduction depended
'crucially' on reducing much of the stock of debt very soon after the
130. See Letter from Joseph Hanlon, Policy Advisor, Jubilee 2000, to author (March
22, 2000) (on file with the Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal).
131. See Joseph Hanlon, Jubilee 2000/South Africa, Mozambique Gains an Extra $28
Mn Per Year from HIPC Debt Relief but IMF Imposes New Conditions on Cashew and
Rural Water (visited Apr. 4, 2000) <http://www.aidc.org.za/j2000/documents/
mozambiquerelief conditions.html>.
132. See Jubilee 2000/USA, Overview, supra note 95. For example, privatization may
increase unemployment, and the reduction and elimination of government subsidies on
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completion point."133 Whether this will occur is largely dependent on
how much and how quickly the private sector contributes to the
Millennium Fund.13 4
One way to remove this uncertainty is to have the debt relief plan
focus explicitly on debt service rather than total debt stock. It is the
debt service, not the total debt stock, which affects peoples' lives. The
fact that a country is $1 billion or $10 billion or $20 billion in debt is, in
itself, merely a statistic. No one's human rights in Mozambique are
violated because that country has a $2.9 billion debt (nominal value) to
wealthy creditors. 135 Basic human rights do go unrealized because
Mozambique is paying $1.4 million every week in debt service, instead
of spending the money on education, health care, nutritional programs,
and the like. 136 Also, as a general rule, "[t]he amount of debt a
government can afford to service should be calculated only after the
basic needs of its people have been met."137 So long as debt service
payments are interfering with a country's ability to meet even its
minimal core human rights obligations, those debt service payments
should be cancelled, even if that means completely canceling the debt
relief payments, as would likely be the case for all of the HIPC
countries.138 This means putting the sanctity of human rights ahead of
the sanctity of fiscal balancing.
62 This has not happened under the Enhanced HIPC Initiative. Oxfam
International estimates that figures on debt service and social spending
after countries benefit from the 1999 Initiative will look disturbingly
similar to what they looked like before. 139 For instance, Zambia will be
paying the same on debt service as on health and education combined;
Nicaragua's debt service payments will exceed its spending on health
and education combined. 140
133. Morrison, supra note 9. The completion point is when the creditors actually
forgive the debt. Under the first HIPC Initiative, it came three years after the decision
was made to forgive the debt, during which time economic reforms would continue. Under
the new Enhanced HIPC Initiative, the completion point is "floating," meaning that the
completion point will be advanced if the debtor countries meet certain reform targets
rapidly. See Jubilee 2000 Coalition, Details and Interpretation, supra note 78.
134. See Morrison, supra note 9.
135. See IMF & INT'L DEV. ASS'N, REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE: INITIATIVE FOR HEAVILY
INDEBTED POOR COUNTRIES (HIPC) COMPLETION POINT DOCUMENT para. 1 (1999) (visited
Apr. 4, 2000) <http://www.worldbank.org/hipc/country-cases/mozambique/mozcompl.pdf>.
136. See Jubilee 2000 Coalition, Jubilee 2000 welcomes Mozambican debt service
freeze to UK and calls on creditors to cancel 100% (visited Apr. 4, 2000) <http://www.
jubilee2000uk.org/news/mozamb290200.html>. This is the amount that Mozambique was
paying Western creditors as of February 2000.
137. Jubilee 2000/USA, Overview, supra note 95.
138. Note that many NGOs involved in the debt relief movement, such as Oxfam,
"believe debt service payments should be lowered to 10 percent of government revenue."
Morrison, supra note 9. This position may have political expediencies, but it does not
maximize human rights, as the money that would still be used for debt service could,
instead, be used to reduce poverty and the associated human rights abuses.
139. See Oxfam Int'l, supra note 81.
140. See id. Oxfam's calculations did not factor in the devastation that Hurricane
Mitch caused.
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The Enhanced HIPC Initiative should be broadened to include all
HIPC countries as well as other countries that might not be designated
HIPC countries but share some of their features. HIPC countries that
will not receive debt relief under this second initiative, because they do
not have unsustainable debts according to IMF and World Bank
formulas, do nonetheless have unsustainable debts so far as the rights
and lives of their people are concerned. Angola, for example, spent over
$1.3 billion on debt service payments in 1998; in 1997 Angola had one of
the world's highest infant mortality rates,14 1 only 34.7 percent of the
relevant age group was enrolled in primary schools, 142 and sixty-nine
percent of the population did not have access to safe water.143 And yet
Angola is one of the HIPC countries not expected to be eligible under
the Enhanced HIPC Initiative. 144
There are also non-HIPC countries that require debt relief. For 64
example, Nigeria, originally an HIPC country, 145 spends about $1.9
billion a year on its debt service, compared with $300 million per year
on health infrastructure. This amounts to only about $3 per person in
Africa's most populous country,146 where 51 percent of the population
lacks access to safe water1 47 and the infant mortality rate is 112 per
1000 live births.148 The numbers speak in a loud and a clear voice of
Nigeria's need for debt relief.
In fact, many non-HIPC countries could see dramatic human rights
improvements if they were to receive debt relief as part of a broader,
people-oriented poverty reduction strategy. The vital statistics of
Indonesia, which has a foreign debt of $140 billion,149 for example,
include fifty-seven percent of the population without access to health
services, twenty-five percent without access to safe water,15 0 and an
141. Angola's infant mortality rate was 170 per 1000 live births in 1997. See UNDP,
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1999, at 171 (1999), this section available at <http://www.
undp.org/hdro/Backmatter2.pdf>. The rate was well under 10 per 1000 live births in the
more developed countries. See id. at 168.
142. See id. at 179.
143. See UNDP, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1999, at 148 (1-999), this section
available at <http://www.undp.org/hdro/Backmatterl.pdf>.
144. See IMF, Modifications, supra note 81 tbl.2 (listing 36 HIPCs that may qualify
under the Enhanced HIPC Initiative).
145. The World Bank and IMF removed Nigeria from the list of HIPC countries in
August 1998. See Jubilee 2000 Coalition, Profile: Nigeria (visited Apr. 4, 2000)
<http://www.jubilee2000uk.org/profile/nigeria.html>.
146. See Jubilee 2000 Coalition, Economist Jeffrey Sachs says that debt cancellation is
vital for Nigeria's development (visited Apr. 4, 2000) <http://www.jubilee2000uk.org/news/
nigeria090300.html>.
147. See UNDP, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1999, at 147 (1999), this section
available at <http://www.undp.orgfhdro/Backmatterl.pdf>.
148. See UNDP, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1999, at 170 (1999), this section
available at <http://www.undp.org/hdro/Backmatter 2 .pdf>-
149. See Paul Blustein, Indonesia Announces Bank Guarantee Plan, WASH. POST, Jan.
27, 1998, at D3.
150. See UNDP, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1999, at 147 (1999), this section
available at <http://www.undp.org/hdro/Backmatterl.pdf>. The figure for access to safe
water is from the most recent year available of 1990-97, while the figure for access to
2000]
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infant mortality rate of forty-five deaths per 1000 live births. 5 1
Nor is the Enhanced HIPC Initiative fast enough. Before even
interim relief will be provided under this plan, a country must have
undergone three years of structural reforms. Yet every day in these
countries children are not going to school, are being made ill from
unsafe drinking water, and are dying from easily preventable causes.
HIPC countries are in violation of their obligation to ensure their people
with at least a minimal core of human rights today; consequently, debt
relief should happen today.
There are two important impulses behind the HIPC initiatives'
connection to structural reforms that should be acknowledged: the
desire to have the savings on debt relief used effectively, and to help
create a political-economic structure that will lead to economic growth
and thereby enable a country to better meet its peoples' needs on its
own.15 2 Delaying debt relief, however, and prolonging human rights
abuses as a result, is not a wise approach to satisfying these impulses.
Structural adjustment conditions, moreover, breed resentment and, in
the past, have actually contributed to poverty, rather than poverty
reduction. 53
These impulses can be satisfied consistent with a policy of strong
respect for human rights and without engendering the resentment that
comes when the IMF requires countries to undergo structural reform.
In terms of the first goal, ensuring that the reductions in debt payments
are indeed channeled into programs to help the poor, several central
elements of Uganda's efforts to use money saved by debt relief to the
benefit of its people are instructive."54 One is its Poverty Action Fund,
to which all savings from debt relief are allocated, and all of which are
earmarked for poverty reduction activities. This very simple device has
powerful ramifications, as it allows a connection between debt relief and
poverty reduction to be easily established, and helps assure that debt
relief will in fact go to poverty reduction measures. 55 Each country
health services is from the most recent year available of 1981-92.
151. See UNDP, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1999, at 170 (1999), this section
available at <http://www.undp.org/hdro/Backmatter2.pdf>; see also supra note 138.
152. See IMF, Overview, supra note 84.
153. See supra note 128 and accompanying text. See also, e.g., Steven Greenhouse,
Five Questions: for Juan Somavia; Making Markets Work for All, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24,
1999, sec. 3, at 4 ("Many of the things that were done to make structural adjustment work
meant that an enormous number of companies went broke. Somebody has to have an eye
on what happens to people," quoting Juan Somavia, director-general of the International
Labour Association); Eric Pooley, The IMF: Dr. Death? A case study of how the global
banker's
shock therapy helps economies but hammers the poor, TIME, Apr. 24, 2000, at 47
(asserting that structural adjustment programs "drive up the cost of living, rip holes in
already tattered safety nets and help kill small farms and businesses"); UNICEF &
Oxfam Int'l, supra note 34, para. 5.7 ("fiscal conditionality is sometimes too tight, and
therefore an impediment to the public investment needed to finance improved access to
basic services").
154. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
155. Recall the difficulty in determining the effects of debt relief in Bolivia. See supra
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qualifying for debt relief would do well to create its own version of the
Poverty Action Fund. A second important element in Uganda's plan is
the prominence of monitoring. As with the specific fund for debt relief
savings, the transparency of that fund, with quarterly publications of
financial flows and annual independent audits, helps assure that debt
relief will lead to poverty reduction.
There are other ways to deal with the desire to make the debt relief 69
plan part of an effort to create lasting, positive change in impoverished
countries. For instance, one way to use debt relief to institutionalize the
enjoyment of human rights is to have immediate and complete debt
service relief-but not complete debt stock forgiveness. Under this
approach, while the countries would not be servicing the debt, they
would technically remain in debt. At the outset of the plan, they could
nominally continue to owe creditors billions of dollars. The purpose of
prolonging the debt relief process would be to help ensure that a one-
time debt forgiveness program would not turn into a one-time only
increase in social spending and, at the same time, to encourage the
creation of democratic institutions that prioritize human rights.
Prolonging the debt relief process could, thus, be used to create a
mechanism for ensuring that the benefits of debt relief to the people of
impoverished countries outlast a potentially transitory international
spotlight on the suffering to which the debt service payments
contribute.
The total debt stock could, therefore, be eliminated over a period of 70
years. Debt relief would be contingent on certain levels of social
spending-targeted increases in health care spending, education
spending, programs to bring about universal access to safe water and
sanitation, and the like. Within these very general contours of how the
money should be spent, the people of each country-not only political
actors, but a broad spectrum of all society, including NGOs and
community leaders-should decide what the priorities are and how to
go about meeting them. As governments spend what would otherwise be
debt service on improving the human rights of people within their
jurisdictions, creditors could gradually reduce the debt stock until, at
the end of the scheduled period, the debt is fully forgiven.
The gradual rather than immediate relief of the debt might stir 71
concerns of Western imperialism-of the North hanging debt over the
South's head to enable it to maintain leverage. This plan might be seen
as a new incarnation of the structural adjustment requirements of the
IMF, conditions imposed by the more developed countries that the
developing countries must meet in order to receive certain benefits. For
at least three reasons, however, such a comparison would be mistaken
and the image of imperialism would be an illusion.
First, the central criticism of the debt itself is that it is unfair for 72
countries so poor, and that already spend too little on health care,
text accompanying notes 63-67.
20001
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education and the like, to have to pay such large sums of money to
wealthy countries. Therefore, all that the countries would be required to
do would be precisely what one would expect them to do anyway: to
increase social spending with the money that will no longer head to the
rich.
Second, within very broad parameters that address the central
wrong of the debt, the people of the impoverished countries, not
Western governments, would determine the nature of the social
spending increases. It would be a plan of the South, not a dictate from
the North. This would be in keeping with the Ugandan model of wide
participation in forming the country's poverty reduction strategy.
The third reason that prolonging the existence of the debt stock, at
least nominally, should not be viewed as a modern guise of Western
domination reveals the importance of viewing debt relief as a human
rights issue, and not simply as a development and poverty issue. It is
arguable that it is not the concern of one nation how another nation
develops, that the nature of a country's social and economic
development is at the heart of state sovereignty. This is part of why
there is much dislike for the IMF, for it is telling these countries how to
run their economies, with all of the effects this has on society. In other
words, these institutions dominated by wealthy nations are telling them
how they should go about their development.
Human rights, however, are recognized as matters of universal
concern. Whatever one's views are on the issue of state sovereignty and
development, it is far too late to plausibly assert that the people of one
country have no legitimate concern for the human rights of the people
in another country. As the 1993 Vienna Declaration and Programme of
Action observes, "the promotion and protection of all human rights is a
legitimate concern of the international community."'156 Thus, it could be
much more palatable for the recipient country to have debt relief
conditioned on human rights improvements rather than on the course of
its development, even if they are, in practice, intimately related.
76 What if countries fail to live up to social spending agreements?
Under the approach of the two HIPC initiatives, if a country does not
implement the required structural reforms, debt relief will not be
forthcoming. There is a better way. Simply requiring countries to
resume debt service payments, at least in isolation, will not advance the
goal of improving people's enjoyment of their rights as human beings,
which should be central to debt relief. Rather, creditors could send the
debt service payments from the recalcitrant governments back to that
country, but directly to local NGOs and community-based organizations
that will work to improve human rights in their country, so that people
can still see their health care and access to education improve even if
156. World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration and Programme of
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the government would rather increase military spending.
Conceivably, creditors could bypass governments in the first place 77
by collecting debt service and then redirecting all of those funds to local
NGOs. This approach would have several drawbacks, however. It would
mean that at least to an extent, the more developed nations, rather
than the people of the indebted nations, would be choosing what to
spend the money on. Creditors would be giving the money directly to
certain NGOs, rather than to a central fund to which virtually everyone
has access and for which everyone can be involved in determining
spending priorities. This approach would also exclude the government's
role in poverty reduction, which, as Uganda and the cancelled school
fees demonstrate, can be significant and positive. Also, bypassing the
government could upset relations with that government, which might
feel that is not being regarded as important, and could have damaging
effects, possibly leading to hostility or oppression.
Debt relief alone, however well implemented, cannot bring about 78
the full enjoyment of human rights. Among the HIPC countries are
Burma with its repressive military dictatorship and Sudan with its
seemingly interminable and very destructive civil war. It will take far
more than increases in social spending and strengthened civil society to
bring such countries into conformity with universal human rights
norms and to transform their governments. 15 7 Nor will savings from
debt relief wholly curb the massive human rights violations suffered by
the poor around the globe. Even as debt relief will allow countries to
spend significant portions of their budgets on improving the lives of
their people, one must recall that these are small budgets to begin with.
It is unrealistic to expect that, absent change external to the debt relief
regime, poverty can be extinguished. But a well-executed debt relief
strategy is an extremely important step along that path.
VI. CONCLUSION
Debt relief, if part of a broader strategy to reduce poverty, can be a 79
powerful tool for advancing human rights, helping to save literally
millions of lives and to greatly improve the lot of many millions more.
The 1999 Enhanced HIPC Initiative is a step in this direction. While
Uganda is still heavily indebted, the first HIPC Initiative helped bring
an additional two million Ugandan children into the classroom. With
the promise of more significant reductions in debt service and a new,
central focus on poverty reduction, the new debt relief initiative has the
potential to produce better results still.
These better results, however, are still far from satisfactory. As 80
money that could go to health care and education, to saving and
bettering lives today, continues to be used to pay off the debts of
157. And, of course, it is not certain that an effort to increase social spending would
even succeed in these countries.
2000]
29
Friedman: Debt Relief in 1999: Only One Step on a Long Journey
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2000
YALE HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT L.J. [Vol. 3:191
yesterday, the silent casualties of the muted war of poverty will
continue to mount. They are victims of the age-old cannonballs of
disease and ignorance that-incredibly-are still flying in the year
2000.
Leaders of industrialized nations have been reluctant to embark on
complete debt relief because they "oppose setting a precedent of wiping
out all of a lender's debt."158 It would be, in the language of economics, a
"moral hazard," creating the risk that countries will not take their debts
seriously. One cannot help but wonder which is the greater moral
hazard: the possibility that some future debtors will take their debts
less seriously, or the reality that the large portions of their budgets that
impoverished countries spend on debt service to the wealthy nations
could be used instead to save millions of lives. If the greater danger is
the gross violation of human rights that the deaths of millions of
children entail, then the Enhanced HIPC Initiative, while a step
forward, lands well short of the demands of human rights and human
dignity.159
158. See Cohen, supra note 3.
159. In our midst will remain the young child whose stomach is bloated from
malnutrition, whose body is weakened by vitamin deficiencies, whose mind is dulled by a
lack of schooling and lack of nutrition, whose life is often put in the balance by diarrhea
and infections that could be easily treated, whose face is often the resting place of insects
that sense death in the air. There will remain many such children. A more earnest debt
relief plan could have gone, and could yet go, a long way toward replacing that scent of
death with the scent of life. So long as this suffering continues to be with us, our society
silently but mightily mocks "the inherent dignity ... of all members of the human family."
Universal Declaration, supra note 18, preamble.
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